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Mine-community relations, labour conflict and redistributive policy: the socio-political 
dynamics of mine mechanisation in South Africa 
 
1: Introduction 
This paper examines the causes of trends towards increased mechanisation in South African 
platinum-group metals (PGM) mining, and its socio-political consequences.  Following 
recent declines in many commodity prices, mining globally has intensified its focus on cost-
control and productivity, generating impetus towards increased mechanisation and 
automation (McKinsey 2017; EY 2016, 12-13; PWC 2016, 30). This pressure is particularly 
acute in South African PGM mining. For historical reasons outlined in the paper, the sector 
developed around a highly labour-intensive business model similar to South Africa’s 
historically dominant but declining gold sector. The apartheid-era institutional framework 
enabled white-owned mining companies to control wages, secure highly consolidated 
ownership of mineral property rights, and enclave their operations from adjacent 
communities. After the transition to democracy in 1994, PGM mining experienced rapid 
growth, eclipsing gold as the largest mining sub-sector with over 200,000 workers at a 2008 
peak, and accounting for three-quarters of global platinum supply.1 However, this growth was 
path-dependent on its labour-intensive business model, which as the paper demonstrates has 
become increasingly unprofitable and incompatible with the changed institutional context of 
the post-apartheid period.  
 
                                                 
1 Source: Johnson Matthey Data, Platinum Supply and Demand by Region. 
The South African mining industry has been declining as a proportion of economic activity 
since the early 1980s, shrinking from 14% of GDP in 1994 to 7% in 2016.2 Nonetheless, it 
remains economically important due to its large multipliers and contribution to export 
revenues. Mining has also remained potently symbolic as an embodiment of the multiple 
racialised inequalities of the apartheid system. Various post-1994 legislative reforms have 
sought to address these inequalities, and the industry has been a nexus of continuous, intense 
distributional contestation between government, new black business elites, mining 
communities, organised labour, and increasingly internationalised mining companies. This 
contestation has been particularly intense in PGM mining over recent years. With rising 
labour costs, decreasing productivity and falling prices, around half of operating PGM mines 
are estimated to be unprofitable (Bowman 2016; Baxter 2016). This is accompanied by 
multiple social problems relating to the migrant labour system and poor living conditions in 
informal settlements which have grown in mining areas. Labour conflict has been severe and 
destabilising. Most notably, the strike wave of 2012 culminated with the Marikana massacre 
in which South African police shot dead 34 striking mineworkers, and the five-month strike 
of 2014 which was the longest in South African history (Chinguno 2015; Mnwana 2015; 
Sinwell 2015).  
 
The mining industry, and gold and PGM mining companies in particular, now see increased 
mechanisation as crucial to to securing financial sustainability (Chamber of Mines 2017). As 
Chris Griffiths, Chief Executive of Anglo-American Platinum (Amplats), the world’s largest 
platinum producer, stated recently, ‘[w]ith industry margins being squeezed on all fronts, we 
simply have to embrace innovation … that involves moving away from the past conventional 
labour-intensive underground mining’ (Anglo American 2015, 5). As the paper shows, 
                                                 
2 StatsSA, Publication Series P0441 - Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
alongside this financial rationale are important socio-political rationales. Increased 
mechanisation is expected to offer a path away from the sector’s turbulent labour relations 
and notoriously poor working and living conditions, and thereby not only restore its 
profitability but enhance its socio-political legitimacy. However, as the paper argues, the shift 
to mechanisation may solve one set of problems but create another. Notably, the ‘social 
thinning’ (Ferguson, 2006) created by mechanisation means the socio-environmental 
externalities accompanying mining may not be compensated for by mass employment 
opportunities, which creates new potential forms of tensions with communities and the state 
given the context of high unemployment and high expectations of the mining industry’s 
developmental contribution.  
 
In developing this argument, the paper analyses the key causes and consequences of the 
advancing spatial and technological reconfiguration of PGM mining. It focuses on issues of 
equity in value distribution, socio-ecological impacts and risks created by different mining 
business models, and the expectations of different stakeholders regarding the developmental 
contribution of mining (see Bebbington et al 2008; Kemp et al 2011). In doing so, it firstly 
contributes to literature on community conflict and development in the mining industry (e.g. 
Bebbington et al 2008; Bebbington 2012; Franks et al 2014; Le Billon 2012; Kemp et al 
2011; Kemp & Owen 2013; Thorp et al 2012; Gilberthorpe & Banks 2012). Within this 
literature, the paper argues, there has been relatively little attention to how the specificities of 
mining practice and extraction models interact with developmental outcomes. With 
mechanisation and automation an accelerating trend in throughout other parts of the mining 
industry in South Africa and globally, there is a need to address this. Secondly, in improving 
understanding of evolving corporate strategies in the increasingly complex, fractious and 
politically disputed terrain of South African mining, the paper has broader relevance for 
understanding the changing dynamics of state-business relations and distributional 
contestation in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
After discussing research methods, data sources, and pertinent secondary literature, the article 
analyses in detail the co-evolution of South African government policy on the developmental 
contribution of mining and corporate strategy among the major PGM mining companies, in 
particular the world’s largest producer, Amplats. This explains the erosion of the financial 
and socio-political sustainability of the conventional labour-intensive PGM mining business 
model, and the drive towards a mechanised alternative.3 The third section provides case-study 
empirical material from ethnographic field research and analysis of company accounts to 
explore the differing impacts of labour-intensive and highly-mechanised mining. The paper 
concludes with reflections on the impact of increased mechanisation on mine-community 
relations and distributional contest in South Africa.  
 
2: Research methods and data sources 
The paper utilises a combination of data sources and research methods. Data on mine-
community relations and community conflict dynamics is derived from extensive 
ethnographic fieldwork carried out in the major PGM mining districts of South Africa’s 
North West and Limpopo provinces, on the Bushveld Complex’s4 western and northern limbs 
(Figure 1). 
                                                 
3 It is important to stress that mechanised and labour-intensive mining in PGMs are not a simple binary. The 
latter uses mechanical loaders, scrapers and haulage to varying degrees. However, it is the removal of human 
labour from drilling and loading processes in conventional stoping methods that has proven difficult to achieve 
(Stewart 2015). 
 
4 The geological formation estimated to contain 80% of the world’s platinum deposits (Cawthorn 2010, 205). 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Bushveld Complex, South Africa 
Source: Reproduced with the permission of Johnson Matthey. Originally in Cawthorn 
(2010). 
This research, which began in 2008, has investigated the multiple impacts of PGM mining in 
several rural communities, and involved multiple extended stays in affected villages. It has 
involved comparison of community relations between different tribal authority areas (as 
discussed further below, tribal authorities are pivotal mediators of mine-community relations 
in South Africa) and different mining models. This article employs case-study material from 
Amplats’ Union mine (sold in 2017 to Siyanda Resources) and Mogalakwena mine. The 
former is one of the oldest platinum mining operations in South Africa, and an architype of 
the conventional labour intensive operating model. It is located on the border between 
Limpopo and North West province, 25km north of the Pilanesberg National Park, in a 
predominantly rural area under the control of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela tribal authority. The 
latter mine, in contrast, uses highly capital-intensive, open-cast mining methods. It is situated 
in rural Limpopo Province, 30km north of Mokopane, in the Mapela tribal authority area. The 
comparative research conducted in these communities drew on different qualitative research 
methods. This included unstructured ethnographic observations and in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with a wide range of community members. More than 300 in-depth interviews 
have been carried out since 2008, with informants including traditional leaders, leaders of 
community-based-organisations and local government and mine officials.     
 
The authors’ used a combination of qualitative document analysis, semi-structured interviews 
and descriptive statistics to analyse the co-evolution of corporate strategy and government 
policy. The document analysis utilised relevant grey literature including government policy 
documents, reviews carried out by the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), and 
publicly available company documents including annual reports and investor presentations. 
This was triangulated with relevant secondary literature, including material from academics 
and civil society organisations, business media coverage of the sector. Interviews with key 
informants selected by purposive sampling, primarily current and former senior managers 
from the industry, have been used to deepen the understanding of corporate strategy, but are 
not quoted here to preserve anonymity. Finally, in order to analyse the differing financial 
characteristics of labour-intensive and more mechanised PGM mining, and trends in 
productivity, the authors compiled time-series financial data from company annual reports 
and official statistics from the DMR. The authors used descriptive statistics and accounting 
ratios to analyse this quantitative data. 
  
3: Literature review  
The point-source nature of industrial mining elicits inevitable social tensions, particularly in 
developing-country contexts. Localised concentrations of negative externalities frequently 
combine with extreme wealth disparities between technologically-advanced, multinational 
extractive industry operations and impoverished host communities, creating extreme forms of 
uneven geographical development (Thorp et al 2012; Bebbington et al 2008; Bridge 2004). 
The extractive industry’s expansion into new regions of the Global South during the 2000s 
commodity boom resulted in a range of new protest movements mobilising around these 
tensions (Bebbington 2012; Perrault 2013; Urkidi & Walter 2011). The rising frequency and 
severity of mine-community conflicts is now recognised as a significant business risk for 
multinational mining companies (Franks et al 2014; Hodge 2014). This has generated 
increased attention to means of conflict mitigation and improving community relations in 
contexts of weak institutions. Forms of corporate-social responsibility, community 
development initiatives and stakeholder engagement see mining companies taking on quasi-
governmental roles to address this in areas where state presence is limited and public services 
inadequate (Campbell 2012; Hilson 2012; Kemp et al 2011; Harvey 2014; Rajak 2011; 
Franks et al 2014). Whether such initiatives create peaceful and developmentally beneficial 
mine-community relations depends on multiple mediating factors. These include local 
expectations of the developmental role of mining companies (Bebbington 2008; Frederiksen 
2017), and the institutional context at local and national levels (Thorp et al 2012; Bridge & 
Jonas 2002). Besides distributional injustices and perceptions thereof, questions of procedural 
and interactional justice are additionally important factors (Kemp et al 2011).  
 
There has been relatively little consideration in this literature of how shifts in the materiality 
of mining practices and the differing labour and capital intensity of mining business models 
interact with these socio-political factors (though see Himley 2013). In particular relating to 
the question concerning this paper, of the socio-political causes and consequences of shifts 
towards greater mechanization of industrial mining in a developing country context. Such 
issues have received more attention in economic development literature, where the ‘enclave’ 
nature of capital-intensive industrial mining with limited local economic multipliers, and the 
negative implications thereof for economic growth and diversification, are longstanding 
concerns (e.g. Singer 1950; Morris et al 2012; Jourdan, 2014; UNECA, 2011). Attention to 
the developmental consequences of technological upgrading has also been a particular 
concern of artisanal mining scholars, since formalisation initiatives frequently involve 
increased mechanisation which reduces labour intensity with consequences for livelihoods 
(Verbrugge & Besmanosc 2016; Saldarriaga-Isazaa et al 2013; Hilson et al 2016)  
 
It is important, we argue, to pay greater attention to such issues of technological and 
operational change in industrial mining in developing country contexts also. Changing 
demands for labour from mining operations, in terms of both numbers of workers and skill 
levels, matters not simply for labour relations but also for mine-community relations. 
Contests over the distribution of risks and benefits are key drivers of mine-community 
conflicts (Kemp et al 2011; Bebbington 2008; Bridge 2004), and within such contests direct 
employment opportunities for locals vis-a-vis workers from outside the mining locality often 
feature centrally (see Frederiksen 2017; Kemp & Owen 2013, 100; Himley 2013; Van Alstine 
& Afionis 2013; Gilberthorpe & Banks 2012; Smith & Dorward 2013). Employment is a 
crucial means by which mining activity may deliver local benefits, with mining companies 
frequently being the only large-scale, modern, formal employer in regions defined by 
precarious informal or agrarian livelihoods. Even in the presence of extensive non-
employment-based redistributive mechanisms – such as royalties or CSR expenditure on 
amenities and infrastructure – direct employment continues to be highly sought after among 
mining communities (Ibid). Tension around this matter commonly arises because industrial 
mining has employee skill requirements which may preclude most locals, while in-migration 
of labour can create additional pressures over land and other resources (Gamu et al 2015, 
168; Van Alstine & Afionis 2013, 366-370; Gilberthorpe & Banks 2012, 189-191; Smith and 
Dorward 2014, 32; Frederiksen 2017, 15; Garvin et al 2009, 579; Kamlongera, 2013). 
  
In situations where mining operations not only fail to provide significant employment 
opportunities for locals but also disrupt existing livelihoods, mine-community relations are 
particularly fractious. As Bebbington et al (2008) noted, this was a feature of extractive 
industry expansion into new rural geographies during the 2000s boom. The struggles elicited 
were ‘frequently over the meaning of development rather than simply over the distribution of 
rent’ with participants often ‘arguing that extraction should simply not occur in a particular 
place, or even not at all’ (Ibid, 901). Such protests are better understood as ‘defensive 
responses to accumulation through dispossession rather than accumulation by exploitation’ as 
in conventional labour-capital conflicts in mining (Ibid, 903).  
 
Such shifts in the nexus of mining-related tensions are an outcome of transitions between 
what Ferguson (2006) conceptualised as socially ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ variants of the extractive 
industry in Africa. The ideal-type for former is the labour-intensive Zambian copper mining 
industry of pre-privatisation ZCCM, dependent on a unionised and politically influential 
workforce and paternalistically engaged in local systems of social reproduction (Ibid, 197). 
The latter’s ideal-type is the Angolan offshore oil industry, with a small number of well-paid 
and primarily foreign staff running capital-intensive operations using imported goods and 
equipment (Ibid, 198-199). Maintaining these enclaved operations in contexts of extreme 
local poverty was frequently dependent, Ferguson observed, on heavy security, but had 
appeal to multinationals seeking to avoid complex local political entanglements. In South 
African PGM mining intense labour conflict (see Chinguno 2015; Sinwell 2015; Capps 2015) 
rising production costs and multiplying distributional pressures from government and 
communities have led companies to seek a more ‘socially thin’ operating model through 
mechanisation. The following sections outline the causes of this transition, and its likely 
consequences for mine-community relations. 
 
3: PGM mining after Apartheid: state-driven attempts at social thickening 
Throughout the colonial and apartheid periods, the South African state employed 
administrative measures that institutionalised deep racial inequality. In mining, this involved 
preventing black ownership of mineral wealth alongside engineered land scarcity which 
created the migrant labour system (Beinart 2001, 155-164). Control of migrant workers from 
impoverished South African ethnic homelands and neighbouring countries was maintained 
through ethnically-segregated worker hostels – separate from local communities – and 
restrictions on personal and political freedoms (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2010, 244-247; 
Forrest 2014). Cheap black labour alongside challenging geology resulted in a highly labour 
intensive business model for gold and PGM mining in particular, using physically arduous 
and dangerous drilling-and-blasting methods (Stewart, 2015: 634-636). While labour 
intensive, this was a ‘socially thin’ model in which the mining company was enclaved from 
host communities, with negligible developmental obligations. 
 
In the post-apartheid period, government, trade unions and civil society have introduced a 
range of new distributive pressures, seeking to improve wages, working conditions and 
developmental contributions to mining communities. New legislation in the 1995 Labour 
Relations Act, 1996 Mine Health and Safety Act, 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 
and 1998 Employment Equity Act, entrenched union freedoms, set minimum standards in 
areas like working hours and leave, and forced companies to pursue affirmative action. The 
landmark post-apartheid mining legislation, the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA) 2002 nationalised mineral resources and introduced a licensing 
system requiring companies to meet targets for developmental contribution and historical 
redress in the 2004 Mining Charter (updated in subsequent iterations). These covered de-
racialisation of management, preferential procurement and transfer of 26% equity-equivalent 
ownership to black-economic empowerment (BEE) partners (Department of Minerals and 
Energy, 2004). It also required government-approved five-year Social and Labour Plans 
(SLP) outlining developmental commitments to the workforce and adjacent communities 
(Ibid).  
 
The dissolution of the migrant labour and hostel system resulted in workers becoming 
resident in mining communities, generally in informal settlements which expanded rapidly as 
PGM employment grew from just under 100,000 in 2000 to over 200,000 in 2008 
(Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 2015). As such, workers faced multiple living costs previously 
provided for by hostels. Companies therefore introduced ‘living-out allowances’ on top of 
wages. However, with multiple dependents, high basic-goods’ inflation and a low ‘social 
wage’ due to the severe inadequacies of municipal service delivery, there has been continued 
upward-pressure on wages and discontent over living conditions (Makgetla & Levin, 2016). 
This is manifested in labour costs. During most apartheid decades, wages barely increased 
above inflation, the important exception being the 1970s (see Forrest, 2014: 152). After the 
democratic transition, unionised workers secured above-inflation increases in the 1990s and 
2000s (Table 1) (Bowman & Isaacs 2015). Average PGM mining remuneration increased, in 
real terms, from R6,000 per-month in 1992, to R16,000 per-month in 2014. These increases 
are similar to other mining sectors, but contrast sharply with the wider economy where 
sectors such as manufacturing, construction and agriculture saw more modest increases 
(Figure 1) (Finn 2015). While PGM wages remain generally lower than other mining sectors, 
the increases have greater financial impact since labour tends to account for a far larger 
proportion of on-mine production costs, typically half in conventional mining methods 
(Bowman 2016). 
 
Table 1: Real decadal wage inflation in gold and platinum mining 
Source: DMR, Department of Mines; author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 2: average monthly wages by sector (R, 2014 prices)  
Source: DMR; PALMS; author's calculations 
 
Beneath these averages are stark inequalities, particularly in the widespread use of low-wage 
contract labour (Bowman 2016; Forrest 2014). Nonetheless, in aggregate the result has been 
escalating labour costs in a business model predicated on tight control of this variable. This 
has combined with declining productivity. As sector employment doubled between 2000-
2008, kilograms of PGM per employee fell back 40% to 1.4 kilograms.5 Simultaneously, the 
labour cost per-kilogram trebled in a decade (Figure 2). 
                                                 
5 Author’s calculations from DMR data 
 
Figure 3: PGM production (kg000) and labour cost per kg of PGM produced (R000, 
2014 prices)  
Source: DMR data; author’s calculations 
 
In the early 2000s PGM mine labour was still considered low-cost by investment analysts, 
with companies achieving high profit-margins. Subsequent cost-increases – including 
material inputs and electricity – were masked by rising metal prices. This encouraged 
persistence with conventional labour-intensive mining, with a strategic focus on rapid output 
growth over cost control. However, from 2009 the sector suffered persistent low profitability 
as continued rising costs met falling metal prices: platinum prices fell from a 2008 peak of 
$2,000/oz to $1,400/oz in 2014, and since 2015 has hovered around $1,000/oz. Coinciding 
with this squeeze on profits has been instances of severe labour conflict, with trade unions 
arguing that arduous and dangerous underground mining is underpaid and that workers suffer 
poor living conditions in informal settlements that are inadequately compensated for by living 
out allowances. Added to this has been intense inter-union competition.  
 
After relative stability in the 2000s under the hegemony of the ANC-aligned National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM), labour conflict ignited in 2011/12 as the challenger Association of 
Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) amalgamated militant workers’ committees 
demanding a R12,500 ‘living wage’ (Sinwell, 2015; Chinguno, 2015). Violence between 
AMCU, NUM, mine security and police culminated in the latter’s massacre of 34 striking 
mineworkers from Lonmin, then the world’s third largest platinum producer.6 The ensuing 
political controversy and Commission of Enquiry (Marikana Commission of Enquiry 2014) 
focused attention on the sector’s harsh working and living conditions (Alexander 2013; 
Alexander et al 2012; Amnesty International, 2016). Tensions flared again in 2014 wage 
negotiations, with a five-month strike over the R12,500 wage demand, the longest in South 
African history. This again made PGM mining an object of international political 
controversy, with negative implications for buyer and investor risk perceptions.  
 
Alongside labour conflict, the labour-intensive business model has also generated tensions in 
mining communities. PGM deposits predominantly lie beneath densely populated rural 
communal land in North West and Limpopo provinces’ former Homeland areas under 
jurisdiction of several traditional – ‘tribal’ – authorities. Under apartheid, Homelands were 
used to contain the black population in over-crowded rural communities. The legacies of this 
system have endured in extreme poverty, high unemployment and a lack of basic services, 
creating an immensely complex social context for mining activity (Mnwana and Capps, 
                                                 
6 At the time of writing, Sibanye announced plans to purchase Lonmin. 
2015). Into this, the PGM boom attracted large numbers of labour migrants from across South 
Africa and the region. Indeed, the city of Rustenburg, PGM mining’s heartland, was South 
Africa’s fastest-growing urban area post-apartheid, with the population increasing over 400% 
to nearly 400,000 between 1995-2015.7 The doubling of the sector’s workforce to 200,000 in 
the decade to 2008, alongside the reduced role of mine hostel accommodation, resulted in the 
proliferation of informal settlements in already land-constrained areas (Makgetla & Levin 
2016). This intensified demands on infrastructure and social services, and inflamed ethnic 
tensions, with negative implications for social stability and mine-community relations 
(Mnwana 2015a, Mnwana 2015b, Mnwana, Mtero & Hay 2016).  
 
These issues are reflected at Amplats’8 Union Mine in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional 
authority area, formerly part of the Bophuthatswana homeland. One of the oldest platinum 
mining operations in South Africa, it is an architype conventional labour-intensive PGM 
operation. Much of the mine’s land is categorised as tribal property, owned by the Bakgatla 
community.9 The village of Sefikile adjacent to the mine is one of 32 under the authority of 
Kgosi (Chief) Nyalala Pilane, and has experienced severe strains from inward migration. In 
line with the sectoral trend, the Union mine’s workforce almost doubled in a decade, from 
6,000 in 1997 to a peak of 11,000 in 2007.10 During apartheid, mineworkers were 
predominantly housed within a fenced enclave, with white staff in supervisory and 
managerial roles occupying suburban-style bungalows with their families, and black workers 
housed in single-sex hostels with tightly restricted freedom of movement. However, with 
                                                 
7 Author’s calculations from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 
(2014). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. 
8 Until 2017, the Union mine was owned by Amplats, before being sold to Siyanda Resources – a transaction 
that has yet to be completed at the time of writing. 
9 Although the state (Minister of Rural Development and Land Affairs) holds the title on behalf of the 
community. 
10 Data from company annual reports. 
present-day mineworkers almost entirely opting to leave hostels and receive the living out 
allowance, the growing workforce, along with accompanying families and service sector 
workers, shifted to informal settlements which proliferated around the edges of the village. 
  
This was a major source of community tensions when fieldwork was conducted. With the 
majority of the established population living in small homesteads with poorly-built iron 
shacks, this created extreme overcrowding and exacerbated pressures on already minimal 
public services of health and education (See Mnwana, 2015). Additionally, growth of 
informal settlements around the village also resulted in reductions in agricultural land, 
restricting livelihood options. Villagers previously using land for arable farming were 
compelled to cease ploughing. These pressures generated ethnic tensions between the local 
Tswana population and incomers. Indeed, the main informal settlement of Kwecheza was 
nicknamed by its inhabitants ‘Thula Mtswana’, isiXhosa for ‘shut up Tswana’. When this 
study was conducted it contained no public services except for a few communal taps and pit 
latrines, with no roads, electricity, health care centres, or school. 
 
Amplats’ responded to these pressures with conventional CSR initiatives aimed at 
augmenting public services, and a royalty-to-equity conversion with the Bakgatla tribal 
authority. As discussed above, post-apartheid mining legislation sought to increase mining 
companies’ contribution to community development and historic redress through the Mining 
Charter. This process intersected with the ‘retribalisation’ of former homeland areas, as 
legislation from early 2000s enhanced tribal authority powers: in particular, the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003, re-enacted traditional (tribal) 
authorities to preside over the same geographic areas defined by the apartheid government, 
and endowed chiefs and their traditional councils with powers over the administration of 
land, natural resources, economic development, health, welfare, and administration of justice. 
Mining operations across the PGM sector have sought to engage tribal authorities as BEE 
partners for equity ownership transfer and procurement requirements, alongside local social 
and developmental initiatives. Indeed, weighted by value 46% of PGM BEE-ownership 
transactions have been with ‘communities’, predominantly tribal authorities, compared to 
29% for the mining industry aggregated (COM 2015).  
 
In many cases, this has involved conversion of existing royalty payments for land access into 
equity shareholdings which contribute to attainment of the BEE ownership requirements (see 
Mnwana, 2015; Manson and Mbenga, 2014; Capps and Malindi, 2017). This compares to the 
conventional approach to BEE which is to sell shares to BEE entrepreneurs, using 
commercial and vendor debt-financing.  For mining companies, the appeal of tribal 
authorities as BEE partners is securing access to land and stabilisation of the local operating 
environment. Chiefs offer a potential buffer against the complex social pressures generated 
by conventional labour-intensive PGM mining discussed above, as mediators of mine-
community relations with control over revenues, access to local procurement opportunities 
and de-facto labour brokers for mining jobs (Manson and Mbenga 2013; Mnwana and Capps 
2015; Mnwana 2015).  
 
In practice mediation by traditional authorities has not proven consistently effective in this 
regard. In many high-profile cases, this has instead been a catalyst of mine-community 
conflict. Tribal authority has frequently been contested and chiefly authority resisted by those 
disputing lineages and historical claims to land ownership (Mnwana and Capps 2015; 
Mnwana 2016). In some cases, contestation also stems from allegations of corrupt misuse of 
mineral revenues, or abuse of power in controlling access to mining jobs and procurement 
opportunities (Mnwana 2014b). Power struggles among local elites have become inseparable 
from contestation of resources. Rather than a mediating role in mine-community relations, in 
worst cases tribal authorities represent elite capture, fulfilling enforcement functions and 
deploying repressive apparatus to clear former agricultural land (Mnwana 2016:222).  
 
This is exemplified by the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela chieftaincy around the Union mine, which in 
2006 took a R420m commercial loan and agreed to convert a pre-existing royalty to purchase 
a 15% share in Amplats’ subsidiary. Claims the transaction was endorsed by community 
members (Amplats, 2006) were disputed by many community members, while allegations of 
corruption in the use of subsequent mining dividend income and restriction of employment 
and procurement opportunities to the politically compliant have dogged the chieftaincy and 
elicited protest (Mnwana, 2015).  To differing extents, similar disputes have swirled around 
the Bafokeng, Bapo and Bakubung chieftaincies on the platinum belt (See Manson & 
Mbenga, 2014; Capps & Malindi, 2017), supporting mounting criticism of post-apartheid 
mining legislation for promoting chiefly accumulation at the expense of ordinary rural 
residents (Claassens and Matlala 2014:116).  
 
PGM mining companies also engage in more conventional CSR practices, with service 
delivery functions for employees and community members contributing to fulfilment of the 
aforementioned SLPs. However, as Rajak demonstrates, PGM mining companies also used 
CSR to augment their political capital: for companies severely tainted by apartheid legacies 
and the social problems discussed above, CSR became a ‘vehicle for the company’s 
projection of its role as a key collaborator in the new South Africa’ (Rajak 2011, 108). As 
with engagement of tribal authorities as mediators of mine community relations, these 
activities have proven inadequate in ameliorating mine-community tensions and improving 
image and political legitimacy. Company CSR performance has been criticised by trade 
unions, influential civil society organisations and the DMR for inadequacy and lack of 
implementation relative to the scale and extent of social problems in informal settlements 
(Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 2017; Makgetla and Levin, 2016; Bench Marks 
Foundation, 2008, 2014 & 2016). Such criticisms were also levelled by the Marikana 
Commission of Enquiry, which concluded that mineworkers’ abysmal living conditions and 
Lonmin’s failure to meet SLP housing targets ‘created an environment conducive to the 
creation of tension’ (Marikana Commission of Enquiry, 2014: 522-542).  
 
In sum, while undergoing an attempted process of state-driven ‘social thickening’ in terms of 
interconnections with local communities in mining areas and the empowerment of workers, 
this has not resulted in more stable labour or mine-community relations. Instead, due to the 
continued marginalisation of the rural poor in a situation of elite capture of redistributive 
processes, the limitations of CSR practice, and the growth of informal settlements as the 
industry has simultaneously expanded and reduced its use of worker hostels, mining 
companies have faced increased mine-community tensions. At the same time, rising labour 
costs, declining labour productivity, falling PGM prices and the emergence of more radical 
trade union politics has both generated labour conflict and undermined the financial viability 
of conventional labour intensive business models. These factors have increased the impetus 
for a shift to greater mechanisation. As discussed in the following section, the appeal is not 
simply the potential to improve profitability, but also the expectation that the shift might 
improve the sector’s severely tarnished socio-political legitimacy, by removing the problems 
of labour conflict, hazardous working conditions, and large informal settlements described 
above. 
 
4: Escape to the enclaves? The pursuit of mechanisation in platinum mining 
Writing in 2015, Amplats Chairperson Valli Moosa, stated ‘South African society does not 
have sympathy for a business model which is based on low skills and low wages, extremely 
hard work in potentially hazardous conditions, and the migrant labour system’ (Amplats 
2015b, 13). The statement came after the labour and community conflicts described in the 
preceding section, and amid a restructuring of Amplats’ mining portfolio towards becoming, 
eventually, a wholly mechanised mining company in which human labour is removed from 
the mine face and replaced by vehicles (ThomsonReuters 2014). The company sold the Union 
Mine discussed above, alongside its historically-dominant Rustenburg mines. This removed 
50% of the workforce for a loss of only 20% of metal produced (RBC Capital Markets2015). 
As reflected in Moosa’s statement, the rationales for this shift has been socio-political as well 
as financial: an effort to escape the dense and complex social entanglements associated with 
the conventional labour intensive business model. New entrants, established competitors and 
government have now adopted these rationales for the necessity of increased mechanisation. 
The financial rationales can be illustrated using financial data from Amplats’ annual reports 
and accounts. Throughout the industry’s recent crisis a small number of highly mechanised 
mines, representing less than 20% of mined production, have remained profitable through 
low operating costs. These are predominantly on the Bushveld Complex’s less developed 
northern and eastern limbs in the former Lebowa homeland, and in Zimbabwe. Deposits there 
tend to be shallower – with average Western Limb mines 800m deep, compared to 400m on 
the Eastern Limb, and less than 300m in Zimbabwe (Credit Suisse 2012) – and as mines are 
newer they can be designed around mechanised methods rather than expensively re-
engineered. As Table 2 derived from a recent Amplats report shows, conventional mines have 
60% of on-mine cost-base taken up by labour, compared to 40% in mechanised mines and 
less than 20% in an open-cast model.  
 
 
Table 2. Amplats cash operating costs by mining method  
Source: Annual report, 2016 
 
The latter refers to Amplats’ large Mogalakwena mine in Limpopo province, on northern 
limb of the Bushveld Complex, the least developed platinum mining area. In 2013, the last 
year Amplats’ published comparable data, its Rustenburg and Union mines’ 23,000 workers 
produced an average of 43oz PGM per-employee, compared to 346oz/employee from 
Mogalakwena’s 2,125 employees (Amplats 2014). As Figure 3 shows, having achieving 
similar levels of profitability in the early/mid 2000s, the mines diverge after 2007, with the 
labour-intensive Rustenburg and Union mines not recovering pre-crisis levels while 
Mogalakwena sustains consistently high margins. 
 
Figure 4: Operating profit margins at selected Amplats mines 
Source: Amplats annual report and accounts, various years 
 
With mining capital internationally mobile and multinationals under pressure to ration 
investment to projects with globally competitive rates of return. In 2014, Amplats’ 
management committed to a group-level return on capital employed target of 15%, 
committing to deploy capital only to projects capable of meeting this target (Amplats 2015b, 
9). Achieving this entailed ‘transition to a lower-cost, more focused quality portfolio’ 
attempting to grow ‘higher margin and low-cost operations such as Mogalakwena’ while 
selling the Rustenburg and Union mines (Amplats 2015b, 37). Since 2012 the former has 
consistently accounted for around 50% or more of the company’s operating profits, but with 
less than 5% of the company’s workforce, and from only one-fifth of PGM production (Table 
3). 
 
PGM production Employees Mining operating profits
2007 7% 2% 8% 
2008 8% 4% 6% 
2009 11% 4% 11% 
2010 12% 4% 21% 
2011 14% 4% 32% 
2012 15% 4% 71% 
2013 16% 4% 47% 
2014 21% 4% 130% 
2015 NA NA 83% 
2016 NA NA 65% 
 
Table 3: Mogalakwena’s contribution to Amplats  
Source: Company annual reports, author’s calculations 
 
The socio-political rationales relate to the perceived potential of mechanised mining to reduce 
labour and mine-community conflict and in doing so restore the sector’s stability and 
legitimacy of the industry. Compared to labour-intensive conventional mines such as 
Rustenburg and Union, Mogalakwena’s workers are highly-paid and skilled operators of 
machinery. Reportable injuries per million man-hours worked are one at Mogalakwena 
compared to between four and nine at conventional mines.11 The chief-executive of Ivanhoe 
Mines, working towards a 2020 commissioning for its large, mechanised Platreef project 
adjacent to Mogalakwena, said: 
                                                 
11 Author’s calculations from company annual reports. 
Everyone working [at Platreef] will be in an air-conditioned cab and there will be no 
exploitation of human labour. It’s the kind of mine operation where there will be no 
fatalities or injuries. The men and women who work here will be very well paid 
professionals who will lift nothing heavier than a pencil (Cloete, 2016). 
The higher pay levels and lower labour requirements mean such operations are not envisaged 
to generate the large informal settlements associated with conventional Western Limb mines. 
This diminishes potential for the kind of tensions between in-migrants, locals and mining 
companies discussed in Section 3, and enables a more enclaved, socially-thin model without 
the dense social entanglements characteristic of conventional operations. In addition, the 
aforementioned trade union AMCU, dominant at most conventional labour-intensive mines, 
does not command significant support at mechanised operations. A shift toward greater 
mechanisation thereby offers a potential remedy to several of the key sources of mine-
community conflict and labour conflict which have come to typify the South African PGM 
industry. Though Amplats’ is best positioned to pursue such a strategy given the nature of its 
resource base and its comparative financial strengths, and Mogalakwena is a unique 
operation, the strategy has sector-wide appeal has become the established narrative on 
expectations for the sector’s future. Investment from new entrants, notably the 
aforementioned Platreef project, also tends to target more easily mechanisable deposits, as 
emphasised in communications with investors (e.g. Ivanplats 2016).  
 
By some estimates, 30% of platinum production is already fully or partially mechanised, with 
increased usage of partially mechanised drilling and blasting equipment in newer mines over 
recent years (Solomons 2015; Singh 2017). However, mechanisation of existing labour-
intensive underground mines using conventional stoping techniques on the narrow UG2 and 
Merensky reefs poses huge technical and economic challenges (Stewart 2015). Early trials 
found high capital-costs negated labour efficiencies (Rustenburg Platinum Holdings 1990, 6), 
and while conventional methods remained profitable mining companies took a conservative 
approach to innovation (Citigroup 2005; JPMorgan 2005). Anticipating the socio-economic 
problems discussed in Section 3 Lonmin, until recently the world's third-largest platinum 
producer, in the mid-2000s attempted an ambitious transition to 50% mechanised production 
(Lonmin 2006, 12). This involved construction of new mechanised shafts and re-engineering 
existing ones. The programme suffered multiple technical problems and expected cost-
reductions were not realised. In 2008, mechanised production costs were double conventional 
methods (Lonmin 2008, 12-13). The programme was abandoned, entrenching the path-
dependency of conventional labour-intensive mining. In recent years the company has faced 
severe financial difficulties, requiring several share issues. Management suggest its long-term 
prospects lie with un-developed, easily mechanisable projects on the northern limb (Lonmin 
2016, 11). Similarly, Implats, the world’s second-largest PGM producer, has announced a 
long-term strategic shift focus to shallower ore-bodies and has purchased new mining assets 
on the northern limb (Implats 2017, 43-44; Seccombe 2017). 
  
Government approaches to the transition are ambiguous, with support for the sector’s 
mechanisation efforts limited and inconsistent. This reflects broader inconsistencies in 
economic policy which have resulted from increased factional fragmentation within the ANC 
(Bowman 2018). Indirectly, the DMR’s more assertive approach to mine health and safety 
inspections in recent years, and increased willingness to use Section 54 Mine Health and 
Safety Act (1996) to halt operations when perceiving transgressions, has increased the 
impetus for mechanised mining methods which remove workers from the mine-face. Such 
stoppages are viewed as a significant cost to mining companies, with Lonmin in 2009, for 
example, reporting 5% of annual production as lost to safety stoppages (Solomons 2016; 
Lonmin 2009, 6). Direct support for mechanisation as part of a broader modernisation drive, 
meanwhile, was a priority emerging from the 2015 multi-stakeholder Mining Phakisa, 
established to develop solutions to the industry’s crises (Singh 2017). Research for the 
Phakisa estimated that mechanisation could extend PGM reserves from 303Mt using 
conventional methods to 763Mt, and 314Mt to 592Mt for gold (Turner 2016, 14). 
Government has subsequently indicated increased commitments for support and collaboration 
in R&D to further innovation in the mechanisation of gold and PGM mines, for example in 
non-explosive rock breaking technologies (CSIR, 2016). The aim is that output-growth and 
jobs created in mining capital goods value chains can offset job losses to mechanisation given 
appropriate industrial policy support, an approach also supported by the Department of 
Science and Technology and Department of Trade and Industry (Singh, 2017; DTI 2017).  
 
However, these nascent forms of industrial policy collaboration have taken place in a context 
of a severe deterioration in state-business relations over the DMR’s third iteration of the 
Mining Charter, and ‘state capture’ corruption allegations which have engulfed the Zuma 
administration and involved the Mineral Resources Minister (Bowman 2018; Swiling et al 
2017). Additionally, in a context of continued high unemployment – almost 28% by its 
narrow definition in the first-quarter 201712 – and declining employment in mining 
specifically since 2012, major mine redundancies are unlikely to be without political 
controversy. Indeed, Amplats’ previous plans to make 14,000 redundancies at its labour-
intensive mines as part of its attempt to re-orientate towards lower-cost, mechanised 
production in 2012/13, were substantially moderated after pressure from the DMR 
(JPMorgan 2013). In addition to the quantity of jobs created, the nature of the jobs created by 
                                                 
12 StatsSA, Quarterly Labour Force Survey – QLFS Q1:2017. 
a shift to mechanised mining is an important additional factor with social implications. While 
jobs in mechanised mining are higher-paid and safer than in conventional business models, 
they also require higher levels of formal education and training. In the event of a successful 
industrial policy effort that creates new jobs in value chains for mining capital goods to 
replace jobs lost in mining itself, these will not, in most cases, be in the direct vicinity of the 
mine itself where the major impacts of the activity are felt. Therefore, as the next section 
details, the outcomes for mine-community relations may be more complex than envisaged 
since the increasingly socially-thin nature of more mechanised operations can be generative 
of different forms of tension. 
 
5: Redistributive struggles after mechanisation 
This section discusses ethnographic research findings from communities surrounding the 
aforementioned Mogalakwena mine to provide insight into the consequences of increased 
mine mechanisation in the South African context. As mentioned above, the mine is located in 
a rural area of Limpopo province in the former Lebowa homeland, now the Langa-Mapela 
tribal authority area. As with most former-homeland areas, the region suffers high poverty-
levels and population density, inadequate basic infrastructure, and low formal-sector 
employment (Neves & du Toit 2013). Minerals prospecting has a long history in the area, but 
largescale mining began only in 1993. As in many instances with PGM mining, land access 
required a surface lease agreement with the tribal authority. Alongside its 137 km2 mineral-
right area this gave Amplats’ ‘exclusive rights’ over the leased land ‘for the remaining 
economic life of the mine’, in return for a lump-sum rental payment of R1.2m and an annual 
rental of R5,000 escalating by 10% per-year (Amplats 2008, 10). These figures were ‘based 
on the agricultural potential of the land’, and at 1993 exchange-rates amounted to 
US$480,000 and US$2,000 respectively. This compares to Mogalakwena’s 2016 net sales 
revenue of R14bn (~US$1bn).  
 
The thickness and shallowness of the reef allows open-cast mining, which facilitates 
mechanisation but requires large amounts of land. Expansion to a third pit between 2006-
2015 involved relocating thousands of villagers. During fieldwork in 2015-2016, many 
households had lost access to land and other natural resources as a result, with surveys 
suggesting negative implications for livelihoods derived from enclosures of arable and 
grazing land, and relocation to land villagers saw as less fertile (Mtero 2017). Respondents 
broadly claimed harvests has been depleted. As one male farmer explained:   
The size of land I used to have has been extremely reduced by the mine. As a result, I 
only cultivate three out of the fifteen hectares that I originally had. I pay the owner of 
the tractor people R600 to cultivate the three hectares at R200 per hectare. Last year I 
harvested only three small bags of sorghum. As we speak, there is none left in the 
storage. It has all been finished. (Interview: Ga-Chaba/Mokopane.31.03.2015). 
This collision between mining expansion and pre-existing rural livelihoods is starkly 
represented by the clusters of homesteads dotted along the edges of mine-dumps, where 
residents continue forms of subsistence agriculture. Residents complained of impacts on 
water sources, and dust and building damage from blasting. In addition to economic impacts, 
major grievances related to lost cultural and spiritual heritage sites – particularly graves. 
 
As a land-based activity, displacement and environmental externalities are a near-inevitable 
companion of industrial mining. Here, though, these processes occur without the mitigation 
of mass employment to provide alternative livelihood opportunities and local economic 
multipliers. The mine does directly employ over 2,000 people, but most jobs require skills 
and education precluding much of the immediate affected community. Workers travel to the 
mine from nearby Mokopane, a former whites-only town with modern amenities for higher-
income workers. Meanwhile, unemployed youth throng outside the mine entrance daily 
seeking employment. Lack of expected job opportunities from the mine was a widespread 
grievance expressed in interviews. As one young jobseeker put it: 
When the mine first came and presented their relocation vision and promises 
to us, I was genuinely impressed. They talked about how they would take the 
youth away from the streets through employment and educational 
opportunities. The mine is yet to fulfil any of these promises (INT.8.Ga-
Sekhaolelo/Mokopane 08.04.2015) 
When asked to comment about the mine’s local recruitment strategy Kgoshi Langa also 
concurred: 
To a large extent the problem with this mine [Mogalakwena] is that it is 
mechanised. It is not labour intensive. People get employed on contracts but 
for permanent jobs are few. For the mine to employ them [local people] they 
must have maths and science. So those who don’t have maths and science feel 
that they are being marginalised. (Interview, Kgoshi K. D. Langa.10.06.2015) 
 
In an explosive combination economic enclavity combines with dispossession, eliciting 
multiple forms of mine-community conflict: ‘illegal’ land occupation and cultivation within 
the mineral rights area, refusal to relocate and, since 2013, violent collective protests over 
livelihood-related demands, including compensation for land-losses, youth employment 
opportunities and allegations of hiring non-local workers. Some protests disrupted mine 
operations and damaged infrastructure, notably a prolonged 2015 shutdown (Amplats 2015c). 
Consequently, the mine has become increasingly securitised, with mine buildings and access 
routes inaccessible and security personnel at the entrance engaging with outsiders through 
thick bulletproof glass windows.  
 
Increased conventional security has, however, been inadequate to secure a stable operating 
environment, and so Amplats have resorted to familiar tools in using tribal authorities as 
mediators. Following earlier interventions by the central government’s Minister of Mineral 
Resources and the South African Human Rights Commission (Amplats 2016c, 10), a March 
2016 ‘settlement agreement’ between the company and the Mapela Kgoshi David Langa, 
involved an R175m payment of to a community development trust chaired by Langa, with 
other community representatives appointed as trustees, modelled on the corporate structure 
used by the Royal Bafokeng Nation to manage its mineral revenues (Amplats 2016a). 
However, in patterns familiar from other instances in which tribal authorities have been used 
in this fashion, some community members claim the deal was struck without proper 
consultation and centralises control of community-owned mining revenues in Langa’s hands. 
There has been considerable protest against the settlement agreement (amaBhungane 2016; 
ActionAid 2016). Similarly, more conventional community agriculture CSR projects were 
destroyed by protesters (Amplats 2016b). At the time of writing, this contestation meant the 
agreement was still on hold. Amplats management have condemned the protests, suggesting 
they are motivated by opportunistic efforts to control revenues (Stoddard 2016).  
 
5: Discussion and Conclusions 
Drawing on case study material from PGMs, this article has examined the pressures for a 
shift toward mechanised production in the South African mining industry and its socio-
political consequences. As the article showed, the labour-intensive conventional business 
model has been undermined by a combination of rising costs, declining productivity and 
multiple social problems accompanying a large, low-wage, low-skilled and unionised 
workforce, living in squalid conditions in informal settlements which have expanded in 
mining areas over recent decades. Accompanying this, the South African state has used 
legislation to drive a process of attempted ‘social thickening’, extending the obligations of 
mining companies to their workforces and host communities. These multiple, overlapping 
distributional pressures have influenced corporate strategy, and increased the appeal of 
business models with smaller, more highly skilled workforces, most notably represented by 
Amplats’ flagship Mogalakwena mine. Other PGM and gold mining companies now seek to 
achieve similar transitions.  
 
The consequences of this shift has wider significance for the extractive industries in South 
Africa and the rest of the continent. As in the South African PGM sector, the commodities 
boom led mining companies to focus on output expansion as a primary aim, with investment 
flooding into conventionally labour intensive models in the search for growth (EY 2015; 
McKinsey 2017). However, the prolonged commodity price slump – with its attendant 
pressures for productivity enhancements – is now driving the search for radical technological 
innovation to minimise labour costs and other over-heads (Ross, 2015; Njini, 2013). This sits 
uneasily with increased expectations from many African governments – including the South 
African government – and host communities for mining companies to make a larger direct 
developmental contribution. These have manifested in recent years in higher local content 
requirements, local equity ownership obligations and employment quotas (Hansen et al 2016; 
Childs 2016; Andreasson 2015; Roberts 2015). In the South African case in particular, the 
issues surrounding mechanisation reflect broader social tensions and the complex character of 
state-business relations. While some actors within the South African state have sought to 
support mechanisation efforts through R&D and industrial policy support, this comes amid a 
more general decline in state-business relations in mining which hampers such initiatives.  
 
As the article has argued, given the context of high unemployment and inequality, the wider 
shift toward mechanisation may relieve some labour, community and state-business tensions, 
but will likely create new ones. As Bebbington et al (2008) have argued the expansion of the 
mining industry into new territories, in particular in areas where it has disrupted rural 
livelihoods, has been accompanied by new forms of protest. As they observe, ‘[t]hese 
struggles are frequently over the meaning of development rather than simply over the 
distribution of rent, and the actors involved assume more hostile positions vis-`a-vis mining, 
arguing that extraction should simply not occur in a particular place, or even not at all’ (Ibid: 
901). These observations are pertinent with regard to the precarious and unstable social 
landscape around Mogalakwena. The ‘social thinning’ of the mechanised mining model 
meant that the land dispossession and environmental externalities accompanying mining have 
not been compensated for by mass employment opportunities for locals. As per Bebbington et 
al’s terminology, the nexus of conflict has thereby shifted from the labour-capital relation to 
the mine-community relation. Attempts to mitigate these tensions by the mining industry will 
then in turn rely on the effectiveness of the redistributive policy framework and CSR 
initiatives. This will inevitably be challenging since, as Rajak observes in her study of CSR in 
the South African platinum industry, CSR practices ‘serve to exclude large sections of society 
while demarcating a select target zone of responsibility (the ‘community’) which is bound 
into relations of corporate patronage and clientelism’ (Rajak, 2011: 223). The ‘geographies of 
inclusion and exclusion’ (Ibid) thereby created, may in themselves heighten contestation and 
community conflict rather than resolve them – a situation apparent at Mogalakwena and 
elsewhere in the platinum industry. Attempts by industry and government in South Africa to 
use tribal authorities as mediators between communities and mining companies in the 
allocation of mineral revenues and the management of local development initiatives have not 
resolved these tensions. Instead, such efforts produce conflict at community level, centred on 
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